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Abstract. The concept of a dialogue is considered in general terms from the
standpoint of its referential presuppositions. The semantics of dialogue implies
that dialogue participants must generally have a collective intentionality of
agreed-upon references that is minimally sufficient for them to be able to dis-
agree about other things, and ideally for outstanding disagreements to become
clearer at successive stages of the dialogue. These points are detailed and illus-
trated in a fictional dialogue, in which precisely these kinds of referential confu-
sions impede progress in shared understanding. It is only through a continuous
exchange of question and answer in this dialogue case study that the meanings
of key terms and anaphorical references are disambiguated, and a relevantly
complete collective intentionality of shared meaning between dialogue partici-
pants is achieved. The importance of a minimally shared referential semantics
for the terms entering into reasoning and argument in dialogue contexts broadly
construed cannot be over-estimated. Where to draw the line between referential
agreement and disagreement within any chosen dialogue, as participants work
toward better mutual understanding in clearing up referential incongruities, is
sometimes among the dialogue’s main points of dispute.
Keywords: ambiguity of meaning, collective intentionality, dialogue, equivoca-
tion, intentionality, meaning, semantics
1. Introduction: What is Dialogue?
Dialogue is literally two voices. Often we expect discussion to involve the
distinct opinions and reasoning of at least two different persons with differ-
ent points of view developing different arguments to support their positions
against those with whom they are in dialectical opposition. The authors
of such dialogues must enter into the participation of thinkers representing
distinct points of view, much as the playwright must do in a work of drama
or comedy intended for enactment on the stage.
As limiting cases, we must therefore consider dialogues written by sin-
gle thinkers expressing multiple voices from within the resources of their
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own imaginations. Philosophical dialogue is generally written by single au-
thors, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. Or, cen-
turies earlier, in Anselm of Canterbury’s didactic dialogues De Casu Diaboli,
De Veritate, and De Libertate Arbitrii. Nor should we overlook especially
Plato’s more inventive nonhistorical philosophical dialogues, generally in-
volving Socrates as dialectical hero or foil, along with those of Galileo,
George Berkeley, David Hume, Nicolas Malebranche, among many others
from antiquity to the present day.1
2. Two Voices Engaged Together in Reasoning
What is logically required if there is to be dialogue in the most general
sense? We need minimally two voices, although not necessarily those of two
different persons or dialogue participants. A single dialogue thinker need
not be schizophrenic or exhibit multiple personality disorder. It is enough
if an individual can project different philosophical positions as though in
multi-person dialogue, to take on the argumentative stances of different
thinkers at different times, in different characters, or on the basis of differ-
ent assumptions. Philosophical dialogues can evolve as a result of a single
thinker changing his or her mind over time, considering a proposition at
one moment, and then criticizing it from as many different angles as occur
sometime afterward at another.
There seems in contrast to be no requirement for dialogue to involve
the articulation of logically, theoretically or practically opposed positions.
In principle, a dialogue could unfold around the conversation of two voices
that agree with each other and want to further develop their shared ideas.
Interesting dialogues typically involve dispute, debate, argument, critique
and counterargument, a little verbal swordplay. However, there are also
many kinds of interesting and uninteresting genuine dialogues that meet
the minimal expectations for a dialogue nonetheless, which should not be
left out of account in trying to understand the concept of dialogue in its most
general terms, and regardless of the interest we may attach to or withhold
from any of its particular applications.
For two voices to engage in dialogue, as opposed to merely talking in
turns in one another’s presence, it appears logically necessary for the partic-
ipants to understand at least some of each other’s efforts at communication.
This requirement is a matter of referential semantics, and, more specifically,
where dialogue is concerned, of an ideal of collective intentionality. We can
only talk with rather than past each other, and the characters in a dialogue
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of one author’s recollection or fictional creation can only be represented as
talking with rather than past each other, if we as thinkers and speakers share
a minimally sufficient referential intentionality relating thoughts expressed
in the dialogue to the same referentially intended objects of dispute. Other-
wise, there can be no agreement or disagreement about the meaning of the
same concept, the truth value of a proposition, or the deductive properties
of an inference.
3. Shared Referential Intentionalities in Dialogue
The fact that there is no simple formula for determining the exact min-
imum of shared referential intentionalities among genuine dialogue partici-
pants is a sign that the proper functioning and understanding of dialogue is
not a purely logical matter, but involves an irreducible rhetorical dimension.
That is to say that there are decisions to be made and interpretations to be
chosen among possibilities of reading progress toward understanding or the
reverse in the course of a dialogue, and especially in the case of philosophical
dialogues.
Every successful dialogue proceeds in a different way toward securing
the minimal ground for the possibility of both agreement on some things and
potentiality for disagreement on others. A good dialogue is like an airplane
descending from cloud bank to ground. It focuses agreement or dispute
between multiple voices from a starting point of hazy cloud formation to the
relatively more finely and distinctly delinated, generally conceptually more
fundamental, agreements or disagreements underlying the surface disputes
as they often appear already in a dialogue’s opening moves.
The semantic basis for dialogue is among the outcomes of dialectical ex-
change occurring fictionally or reportorially within a dialogue format mov-
ing forward at least in the time it takes for an imaginary speaker uttering
more than one syllable at a single instant of time. That minimal requirement
should be met in every dialogue, even if the two voices offer only one syllable
in reply to another syllable, and the dialogue is done. To think the content
of a proposition Fa, that object a has property F, is already to occupy a mo-
ment of time in thought and its expression. It is not pronounced like the
musical note, but as saying a is or has property F or F of a, F applies to a,
among other forms, the real or imaginary expression of which must occupy
a moment of time, depending on whether the dialogue participants are real
persons whose actual historical dialogical exchange is recorded or invented
for a fictional dialogue. If it seems obvious that dialogue can only take place
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in real or imaginary time, at least in the time that it takes someone to
read or hear more than one syllable of a dialogue spoken, it is nonetheless
worthwhile to emphasize the point, and doing so here should equally not
disappoint.
What we are calling the rhetorical dimension of dialogue is based among
other things on the temporal dimension of points of exchange in an ongoing
discussion. Timing is as important for argument as it is for comedy. The
fact that a dialogue begins when voice A introduces a certain argument,
chooses one out of multiple arrangements of assumptions and conclusions in
constructing or at least gesturing toward an argument, and a second voice B
joins the interchange at a moment of real or imagined time afterward, makes
rather a difference as when B first presents the same argument as in the
original application, and A then later rejoins by offering the same argument
as presented before in the first application considered. It can make all the
difference in the world whether A precedes B or B precedes A in real or
imagined time in presenting identically the same arguments in a dialogue, for
example, as to whether or not A (or B) in offering the argument in question
is begging the question against B (or A), or whether or not A (B) is arguing
against a straw man. If B in the real or imaginary time of the dialogue
has made an argument that A then criticizes, whatever the other merits or
defects of A’s argument against B’s argument, A can hardly be accused of
knocking down a straw man, for B provides the example of a position held
by B against which A’s criticism is directed.
A needs to know at least an essential part of what B means, and vice
versa, in order for their distinct voices to be able to interact dialogically.
Otherwise, we have emphasized, they will simply be talking in succession
but argumentatively past one another. The first requirement of dialogue
would therefore appear to be that the several voices involved in dialogue
must be capable of understanding one another well enough for there to be
sufficient shared referential agreements in order to make sense of the pos-
sibility of their disagreeing. The condition is meant to apply even when
the dialogue participants do not actually disagree, but merely undertake
to examine a jointly accepted agreed upon thesis, in order to explore its
implications or applications, without ever running into assertoric or in-
ferential conflict with one another in their extraordinary harmony, but
rather build positively in dialogue toward a more completely shared col-
lective intentionality. It remains fair to say, for all the importance of em-
phasizing the possibility of sociable ideally positively cooperative dialogue,
most thinkers become involved in dialogue or are represented as such in
fictional philosophical dialogues, in order to thrash out differences of opin-
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ion. In the process, it often results in what are generally considered to
be the most successful philosophical dialogues, not to exclude any other
types, that disagreements are conceptually and inferentially refined, and
clarity and a better sense of the strengths and weaknesses of one’s own
position and that of a dialectical opponent is attained. Such progress in
a dialogue marks it as successful in this sense, even if it does not result in
the resolution of any outstanding philosophical problem, and even if dia-
logue participants remain as alienated from one another’s thinking as they
were at the outset.
If I have lost my sanity, and believe that I hear a voice in my head
that speaks a language I do not understand, then however it may terrify or
amuse me, and whatever behavioral reactions it may occasion, I will not be
able to enter into a genuine dialogue with the voice or its source in some
other distant part of my personality. The voice cannot caution or instruct
me, if I cannot connect with its language, nor can it try to dissuade me
from acting, or create obstacles for the achievement of my wants. If any
of this makes sense phenomenologically, then there will be two voices that
are in some sense co-present, although not in dialogue with one another,
provided that at least one side does not understand at all what the other
is saying. We see in such extreme thought experiments what is needed for
genuine dialogue, by reflecting on exactly how these kinds of cases fail to
instantiate a discussion occurring in real or imaginary time, involving at
least two different voices.2
4. Productive Oppositions Locked in Dialogue
If we believe that there are such things as dialogues, and that minimally
two voices must be able to partially understand each other in order for
a genuine dialogue to occur, then dialogue participants must at least share
in a collective intentionality of reference to some objects and some of their
properties. Only then are they free intelligibly to disagree about others.
Where there is dialogue, there is a modicum of understanding. There
must be such, even if there is as yet no agreement or disagreement on what-
ever substantive issues may have occasioned the dispute. There must be
such, even if the understanding is only partial and most of the dialogue itself
focuses explicitly on potentially irresolvable points of significant referential
and thetic or judgmental disagreement. The referential presuppositions that
make such dialogue possible are sometimes subject to negotiation within an
unfolding dispute.
147
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.04.15 14:57
Dale Jacquette
If A and B are engaged in dialogue about whether or not it is the case
that p, and if p abbreviates the proposition that object a has property F,
then A and B must alike at least dispositionally understand what it means
for Fa to be true, or to be false, to be confirmed by reason or experience, or to
be judged incapable of being determined in truth value one way or the other.
This condition in turn implies that A and B at least to a minimally sufficient
extent must understand the referential meaning of object constant a, the
concept of property F, and of the state of affairs in which a is F, Fa.
A dialogue is not abstract. We remind ourselves of the obvious when we
reflect that it takes place over time. Like a dramatic or comic performance,
a dialogue can involve twists and turns of argument, shiftings of burden of
proof, appearance of succeeding or failing when the opposite is true, and
many other possibilities. A dialogue in this sense is sometimes like a plot
unfolding at the theatre. It can happen, especially in philosophically inter-
esting dialogues, that dialogue participants change their positions, modify
their understanding of the meanings or even meaningfulness of certain terms,
as their dialectical interaction proceeds.
Although dialogue participants might in principle never reach agree-
ment about the exact meaning let alone truth value, significance, utility, or
the like, of Fa in a semantic theory’s preferred normative sense, in the course
of a good dialogue about such a predication, typically among many other
things, ancillary or inferential, interlocutors should at least come to better
understand what each believes the putative predication purports to mean.
If the exact meaning of Fa remains the standout in a dialogue, about which
participants are unable finally to agree, it can only do so against a backdrop
of wide-ranging substantive agreements on the meanings of other terms,
and even concerning the truth value of many propositions, without which
it would not be possible to disagree and sustain meaningful disagreement
concerning the semantic status of Fa.3
5. Equivocation and its Resolution in Dialogue
A sample dialogue of just the appropriate kind to illustrate the previ-
ous points concerning the need for a partial collective intentionality among
dialogue participants is compactly presented in an unexpected source. It
is offered as part of a booklength discussion of the formal semantic inter-
pretation of musical scores by Kari Kurkela, in his published dissertation,
Note and Tone: A Semantic Analysis of Conventional Music Notation. The
dialogue features this exchange:
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(1) Mary: What was that piece?
(2) John: It was the Moonlight Sonata.
(3) M: Did you like it?
(4) J: No, I didn’t.
(5) M: You don’t like the Moonlight Sonata?
(6) J: On the contrary, it is one of my favorite pieces.
(7) M: But you just said that we heard the Moonlight Sonata and that you
didn’t like it!
(8) J: I like the Moonlight Sonata but I didn’t like what we heard...
It is obvious that John and Mary do not talk about the same object all the
time. In (4), for instance, John refers to a single performance whereas in (6)
he speaks of an abstraction...4
Dialogue presupposes a convergence of partial shared references among
individual participants resulting in a collective intentionality. Exactly what
these are typically are not prescribed, but unfold, evolve, are discovered
and revealed in the process of interchange of ideas between dialogue par-
ticipants. John and Mary must each and both mean the same thing by
the ‘Moonlight Sonata’ in order for there to be meaningful communica-
tion of the sort required by two or more voices exchanging ideas in this
application. Although, if pressed, they might be unable to offer specific
insight into the ontology or identity conditions for individual works of mu-
sic. Otherwise, even if only equivocally, they continue to use the same
words from a purely lexical or syntactical point of view, they will not be
able either to agree or disagree, thereby precluding their having a genuine
dialogue.
The above snatch of conversation indicates the point very simply in
a perfectly ordinary exemplary interchange. Such convergence need not take
place immediately or throughout a dialogue at every moment in which there
is discussion. It can be part of the purpose of a dialogue to clarify pre-
cisely these kinds of malocclusions between the conceptual frameworks of
dialogue participants as their viewpoints are modified in and by virtue of
engaging in dialogue. Effectively, distinct voices involved in dialogue can
devote much of their energy to determining of one another precisely what
each participant means by some key term or terms of interest. We need
only think here of Berkeley’s Enlightenment (1713) [3rd edition 1734] Three
Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, where two fictional but philosoph-
ically representative speakers struggle over many pages to clarify the exact
meaning of the words ‘matter’ and ‘substratum’, only to conclude philo-
sophically that the words have and can have no intelligible perceptually
validated meaning.5
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What Kurkela says about the above dialogue between John and Mary is
right enough, as far as it goes. Moreover, although Kurkela does not continue
his analysis in this direction, the specific word that produces equivocation
in the John-Mary dialogue is not ‘Moonlight Sonata’. For while Kurkela
correctly remarks that John refers to something different in dialogue lines
(4) and (6), semantic interest reaches back also to line (2), where John first
responds to Mary’s dialogue-opening question. Dialogues, as an aside, can
and often do, but are under no obligation to, begin with a question, classi-
cally exemplified by Meno’s impudent first line in Plato’s classic dialogue,
the Meno.6 Since Mary begins Kurkela’s dialogue, if there is to be dialogue
at all, then John as the second voice must respond to Mary’s question in one
way or another; else they have not yet begun an actual intercommunication
of voices. Hence, to underscore the obvious once again, John must under-
stand at least part of what Mary says, in the sense of sharing a collective
referential intentionality by designating at least some of the same objects
or concepts in each moment of their exchange.
Rather, the equivocation on which the quickly resolved narrative arc of
the dialogue turns is the species or specimen distinction equally conveyed
by the same equivocal word ‘piece’. What does Mary mean in her opening
question when she asks John ‘What was that piece?’ John, if he is to answer
the question and take part in dialogue with Mary, must try to understand
what she means by ‘that piece’. He manifestly decides that she most likely
wants to know what musical work or composition had just been performed.
Although it appears that Mary and John may have both attended the same
musical performance, context in the case of an actual dialogue with real life
dimension might further reveal that Mary was not in a position to know
what was on the program for the performance, so that John reasonably
assumed she wanted to know what piece, in the sense of musical composition,
he or they had recently heard performed. It might have been Mozart, for
all that John expected Mary to know, it might have been Stravinsky, rather
than Beethoven, or something other than that particular work by Beethoven.
6. Convergence and Divergence of Referential Meaning
in Dialogue
Mary’s next question causes John to step away from his original inter-
pretation of her instigating question. Now the equivocal word to consider
is ‘it’, when Mary asks, ‘Did you like it?’ The connecting reference is that
of anaphor, often ambiguous, as in the old vaudeville joke, in which one
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of two workmen pressing a nail against a board, says, When I nod my
head, hit it with the hammer. It could be the composition or an occasion
of its performance that is intended by Mary’s ‘it’. Since Mary in line (3)
asks, “Did” (instead of “Do”) you like it?, John is cued toward a specific
event in the past, the performance of the composition that they both ap-
parently attended, rather than his appreciation for the composition in more
general terms.
If Mary wanted to know about John’s general sense of enjoyment for
Beethoven’s composition, rather than a particular performance of the piece,
then most likely she would not have directed John to something specific, to
the ‘it’, occurring in the past tense. Otherwise, if she was inquiring about
a possible change in John’s attitude over time toward the composition, she
might have more naturally have asked, ‘Did you ever like it?’ To ask sim-
ply, ‘Did you like it?’, in a dialogue context concerning a musical perfor-
mance, without further specification, carries a strong presumption of con-
versational implicature establishing the referent of ‘it’ as a particular perfor-
mance rather than the composition generally or in the abstract. Especially
is this true if context reveals that Mary may have attended such a concert
performance recently with John or anyway knows that John did. We speak
metaphorically of great works of art as being timeless, and something of
this sense carries over to a composition, such as the Moonlight Sonata, con-
sidered independently of its performances. That this is not Mary’s inten-
tion, the back-reference of her temporally backward-directed anaphoric ‘it’,
is a prime semantic consideration clarified only through John and Mary’s
further dialectical interchange.
Now John understands that Mary wants to know his opinion of the
particular performance he recently attended. He did not like it, and says so
without further qualification in (4). Mary in (5) may assume that if you like
a composition you enjoy most or even all performances of it. Or she may
not be familiar with John’s musical tastes or knowledge of late classical
early romantic music. Her main burden is that she must now deal with the
further semantic consequences of the ambiguity of ‘it’, introduced by her own
contribution (3), and a need to backtrack through the potential referential
misunderstandings in their previous exchange. She must now consider that
when John says he did not like ‘it’, thanks to her own lack of clarity in
posing her previous two questions, he may have meant, for all she knows, in
any of his answers, either the composition or its recent performance. Mary
fully resolves the ambiguity already in line (5), although she does not seem
to know it. John reinforces in (6) his understanding in (2) of what Mary
ought to have meant by ‘piece’. There are musical pieces, which is to say
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compositions, and there are performances of those pieces. Logically, one
might admire a piece but loathe its performance, although presumably one
could not absolutely loathe each and all of its performances, including those
in one’s own imagination, hearing the composition played virtually as one
prefers and thinks it should be performed.7
Mary in (7) expresses her outraged sense of inconsistency at the con-
junction of John’s perfectly reasonable answers, but John in (8) reminds
her of the aforesaid distinction. The key difference is that between musical
compositions considered, as Kurkela says, in the abstract, as opposed to par-
ticular performances. John undoubtedly means colloquially to explain that
he has heard such musically superior performances of the Moonlight Sonata,
that the recent performance in comparison was aesthetically distinctly unre-
warding. He might say that they failed to properly deliver the score, that it
was a travesty of Beethoven to have his music so under-practiced and badly
performed and conducted by such unaccomplished incompetent musicians,
if that is his conclusion. That the performers were not putting enough pas-
sion into the performance. Or the like. Nor were the tickets for the concert
given away for free, John may continue to reflect.
On the whole, John is dissatisfied with the particular performance event.
Although, as he might put it upon further reflection or dialectical dialogical
interrogation, he may again like the composition itself as one of his favorite
pieces. A performance of a piece is not the piece itself in the usual musical
jargon, and in the most natural minimal implied cultural ontology of musical
entities. The distinction remains valid even in avant music, while in other
arts there is talk in specific media of the concept of a ‘performance piece’. By
this is meant a piece that is intended to be performed, however, rather than
both a performance and a piece to be performed, even when the performance
is a performance of the performance piece.
Cross-terminologies in the performance world might therefore be at the
root of Mary’s use of the word ‘piece’ in proposition (1). It is this slippage
of collective referential intentionality that seems to set poor John off in the
wrong direction, as he tries conversationally to respond to Mary’s original
question. The only possibility for John to have headed off further ambiguity
at this early point in the dialogue would have been to respond pedantically in
a variant of (2), (2*) John: It was a performance of the Moonlight Sonata. Or
more pedantically still: (2**) John: It was either the composition Moonlight
Sonata or a particular performance of the composition Moonlight Sonata.
This is not how we want John to talk in ordinary after-concert conversation
with Mary. The ambiguities of colloquial exchange just as Kurkela presents
them are philosophically more instructive.
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7. Generalizing Morals in Kurkela’s Dialogue
The dialogue fragment from Kurkela is not chosen at random. It repre-
sents minimally necessary and sufficient requirements for genuine dialogue
in multi-vocal performances. The proposal is that genuine dialogue requires
speakers at some point to arrive at least at a shared understanding, or
mutually recognized collective referential intentionality.
Progress toward shared meanings can often take the form of resolving
an initial inhibiting referential equivocation, as the Kurkela dialogue illus-
trates, in a productive mutually recognized collective referential intentional-
ity that is minimally necessary and sufficient in the context of a multi-vocal
performance, even for participants to agree or disagree about other propo-
sitions included in the dialogue. Here, the larger target concerns aesthetic
responses to Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata, considered in the abstract as
a musical composition. John and Mary, who certainly get around in the
logical and philosophical literature, work toward untangling what is at first
only ambiguously represented as the object referred to by Mary’s dialogue
initiating question, either by Beethoven’s score and its most accomplished
performances, which John likes, or, and as opposed to that of, a recently
experienced particular performance, which, once their talk comes to focus
on this referential agreement, we eventually come to understand that John
definitely did not like.
The aspect of dialogue emphasized by the presumably fictional exchange
from Kurkela is that it is necessary and sufficient for a genuine dialogue to
occur in the course of a multi-vocal performance, as opposed to persons
taking turns talking past each other in real, imaginary, or virtual presence.
All that is needed for genuine dialogue is for speakers explicitly involved
in dialogue or implicitly in their ongoing verbal exchange to acknowledge
a quantum of mutually recognized collective referential intentionality on
the basis of which they can try to work toward further agreement or better
clarification of irresolvable disagreements. At some point or other in a gen-
uine dialogue, they must be talking to each other about some of the same
things. The general point is obvious, which is not to say it is always theoret-
ically respected. The philosophical implication for argumentation theory is
that what is minimally essential to dialogue is semantically deeper than the
propositional level of entire assumptions and conclusions, reaching down
to the referential meanings of individual words. Much the same result is
reached by arguing that if assumptions are shared, then so are the meanings
of some of the terms agreed-upon propositions contain. The thesis need not
be denied, but neither need it be relied on as the only or even the best route
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toward establishing the minimally necessary and sufficient conditions for di-
alogue among all multi-vocal performances. It remains worth emphasizing
that the theory of argumentation has its own immediately dialogue-related
justification for the conclusion independently of such Frege-inspired but still
controversial semantic principles as semantic compositionality. Why should
we make such commitments in understanding the concept of dialogue, if
there is no need? The vital insight, as essential as it is important to keep
in view in argumentation theory, can be intuitively supported by reflecting
directly on the minimal requirements, necessary and sufficient conditions,
for dialogue. Additionally, the selection from Kurkela depicts discussants
who typify the fact that there need be no preset starting place for dialogue
in any mutually recognized referential agreement, as long as there is the po-
tential of attaining it. Progress toward the goal is successfully made with at
least some mutually recognized collective referential intentionality of shared
referential meanings before the dialogue closes.
The dialogue, brief as it is, when we have mined it for main points of
interest, reveals essential facts about the concept of dialogue, how it might
be appropriately analyzed, and what is minimally required for a genuine di-
alogue among multi-vocal performances that also include non-dialogues. At
a philosophical level, the sample musical discussion between John and Mary
makes it possible with little or no further equivocation or related semantic
clutter to identify and reinforce in a found application. This means that it is
not an application that has not been cooked up as a thought experiment to
illustrate the present thesis concerning the nature of dialogue, but appears
in print for entirely different reasons. There in its innocence we discover the
minimally necessary and sufficient conditions for genuine dialogue among
real historical and fictional multi-verbal performances, in the effort of two
voices to come to mutual understanding of relevant referential meanings.
Genuine dialogue, as opposed to non-dialogue multi-vocal performances,
verbal performances involving two or more speakers, who never touch base
on any referential meanings, need not entail any thetic disagreement, but
must have the potential to work toward a mutually recognized mutually
recognized collective referential intentionality of speaker-shared referential
meanings.
The point once made is unsurprising, for some perhaps even disap-
pointing. It is a tautology, after all, if the situation is correctly understood.
We say only that a genuine dialogue minimally requires or presupposes as
necessary and sufficient conditions the realized potential at some stage of
a multi-vocal performance for participant voices to achieve a mutually rec-
ognized collective referential intentionality of shared referential meanings.
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The conclusion nevertheless has philosophically significant implications. It
is markedly different than the Locke-Whately-Johnstone thesis that all ar-
gument involves the nonabusive ad hominem. John Locke, Richard Whately,
and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., all developed more or less in parallel tracks
the suggestion that in order for there to be argument between different
thinkers, they must agree upon the truth of at least some assumptions.8
Here the point goes semantically deeper, in a way, but can be seen as the
basis of an ad hominem rhetorical interpretation extended to include all
genuine argument. There can be no ad hominem sharing of assumptions,
without the mutually recognized collective referential intentionality of di-
alogue participants, and especially among those arguing with or against
others, concerning the referential meanings of individual terms contained
within the expression of agreed-upon assumptions, supposing there to be
some, even where the corresponding conclusions of the arguments in ques-
tion sharply disagree.
What is essential to genuine dialogue is not necessarily agreement on
any shared assumptions, but only on the recognition of shared referential
meanings of at least some words. Such words need not even belong to any
explicit or background assumptions that genuine dialogue participants may
happen to share or about which they may happen to disagree.
8. Conclusion: Disagreement Pendant on Mutual Understanding
and Collective Referential Intentionality in Argument
The differences between John and Mary in their understanding of the
intended references of special terms in their exchange, centering on the ex-
act references of ‘piece’ and ‘it’ as the dialogue takes shape in imaginary
time, should not be over-emphasized at the expense of their substantial
agreements. John and Mary must at least implicitly believe themselves col-
lectively to intend the same thing by ‘Moonlight Sonata’, the occasion on
which the music was performed, and the grammar of English in this example,
along with words about which John and Mary seem to be in perfect harmony,
such as ‘what’, ‘was’, ‘that’, ‘the’, ‘did’, ‘you’, ‘like’, ‘didn’t’, ‘don’t’, ‘on the
contrary’, ‘is one of my favorite pieces’, ‘but’, ‘just said that we heard’, and
all the components thereof in all their grammatical combinatorics.
Although the word is not used by Kurkela, there seems also to be a sig-
nificant agreed-upon shared reference, with no further clarification required,
to whatever it is supposed to be that ‘we [John and Mary] heard’. Were it
not for convergence of collective intentionality on the same musical event,
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John would have no easy way to resolve the ambiguity explicitly as he does
in (8), between a musical composition, on the one hand, and, on the other,
a particular musical event of its performance. It is the latter which they
both understand and agree they ‘heard’, and the composition rather than
the performance as what John assumes Mary wants to know by asking about
the identity of ‘that piece’ in her opening (1). At least there seems to be no
disagreement or ambiguity in the John-Mary dialogue over the performance
event in question. It is only against such a backdrop of understanding that
John and Mary can enter into referential confusion over other standout
words, leaving the dialogue opening for ambiguity concerning what John
thinks of ‘that piece’. This phrase, for Mary, can apparently mean either
the composer’s musical composition or a musical group’s performance of
the same work on a particular occasion.
We learn a variety of interesting semantic requirements of dialogue from
Kurkela’s John-Mary conversation. Two voices exchanging different points
of view or trying to resolve a question that one or more dialogue participant
wants to answer, and working toward clarification of concepts or a solu-
tion to a problem. As often occurs in dialogue, even with oneself. Dialogue
tolerates and even thrives essentially on a certain level of intentional dis-
alignment between participants. They need not agree on absolutely every-
thing, in order to understand well enough of one another the ways in which
they may not agree, even if it is only in their usage of terms like ‘piece’,
‘Moonlight Sonata’, and in principle any other words, including what one
of them previously anaphorically meant by ‘it’. Whether there is a definite
proportion of referential understanding or collective intentionality to refer-
ential misunderstanding or breakdown of collective intentionality, a limit of
tolerance exists, as to how much misunderstanding a genuine dialogue can
support against a backdrop of understanding and collectively agreed-upon
intentionality, especially in referential convergences, is not formulaic but
a matter of rhetorical judgment that is often worked out only in the ongo-
ing course of the dialogue itself. These boundaries are not usually trivial to
determine, and, in some interesting cases, they may require full imaginative
participation in the dialogue exchange in order to identify exactly where
disagreement occurs and how it originates, before dialogue participants can
see their way clear to resolving their disagreement, if at all, once there is
agreement at least as to major conflicting points in contention. Actual di-
alogue can extend this process far beyond the John and Mary variations,
and in some instances may never actually be resolved.9
The optimistic conjecture, for those with faith or a track record of reli-
able positive experience in using dialectical methods, is that, provided there
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is any basis for understanding, any shared grasp of reference or collective
intentionality between two or more voices on which to build, all ambigu-
ities can eventually be clarified in something like the way that has been
described. Given enough time, physical endurance and good will on the
part of dialogue participants, this level of clarity should always be within
the grasp of open-minded argument between two or more voices, however
disparate their respective dialectical starting places. The clarification for
one another’s benefit of two or more thinkers engaged in dialogue is at-
tainable, from this perspective, even if, in contrast, agreement on the truth
values of the ultimately contested propositions or application of concepts on
which further disagreement centers, the differences that provide the explicit
subject matter of dispute among dialogue interlocutors, is never achieved
by opposing dialogue participants, and the most interesting disputes them-
selves are never dialectically resolved.10
N O T E S
1 An eloquent appeal for the importance of dialogue by a non-philosopher is offered by
theoretical physicist Bohm (2004).
2 For a counter-Aristotelian later Renaissance perspective on the logic of dialectical
discourse, see Ong (2005) [1958].
3 Here I partly follow Garrod and Anderson (1987). Another valuable resource is Reyle
(1993).
4 Kurkela (1986), pp. 136–137.
5 I emphasize this aspect of the philosophical uses of dialogue format in my recent crit-
ical edition of Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (2013). I promote
the use of dialogue format for the same reasons in the seven completed volumes of my
Rowman & Littlefield series-edited, New Dialogues in Philosophy. The series includes my
own Dialogues on the Ethics of Capital Punishment (Jacquette, 2009), alongside book-
length dialogues by six other authors. As further indication of my interest in this genre,
I have written article-length dialogues on a variety of topics, including Go¨del sentence
applications of the Turing Test in philosophy of mind (1993a), Zeno of Elea’s paradox
of Achilles and the tortoise in Jacquette (1993b), and the appeal and limits of idealism
in metaphysics, Jacquette (2012). There is a growing literature written in and about
philosophical dialogues, which I consider to be a healthy sign of interest in the format
of two or more voices as an invaluable mode of conceptual inquiry. I offer further reflec-
tions on the significance of argument and sound reasoning in Jacquette (2013a). See also
Jacquette (2013b) for a review of Finocchiaro’s recent study of meta-argumentation.
6 Plato, Meno 70a1–3: ‘Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not
teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature
or in some other way?’ (Grube, 1981, p. 59). Meno’s cheek in raising such a question would
not have been lost on Plato’s original readers, who would have known what a scoundrel
Meno was from town gossip to the pages of Xenophon’s Anabasis.
7 The classic source is arguably Grice (1969). See also, from this same prolific era,
Searle (1969), especially Chapter 2, ‘Expressions, meanings and speech acts’, pp. 22–53.
Minsky (1969).
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8 A useful source is Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. (1996), with essential references to Locke
and Whately. Also Johnstone (1952); (1954).
9 See especially Walton and Krabbe (1995). Asher and Lascarides (2005). Lorenzen
dialogical logics are explained in Rueckert (2011). An introductory approach with some
similarities of conclusion is offered in Redmond and Fontaine (2011).
10 I am grateful to two anonymous journal referees for insightful comments and sugges-
tions for improvement, which have contributed to my revisions of a previous version of
the essay.
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